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Abstract Erceg et al. (J Monet Econ 46:281–313, 2000) introduce sticky wages
in a New-Keynesian general-equilibrium model. Alternatively, it is shown here how
wage stickiness may bring unemployment fluctuations into a New-Keynesian model.
Using a Bayesian econometric approach, both models are estimated with US quarterly
data of the Great Moderation. Estimation results are similar in the two models and
both provide a good empirical fit, with the crucial difference that our model delivers
unemployment fluctuations. Thus, second-moment statistics of the US rate of unem-
ployment are replicated reasonably well in our proposed New-Keynesian model with
sticky wages. Demand-side shocks play a more important role than technology inno-
vations or cost-push shock in explaining both output and unemployment fluctuations.
In the welfare analysis, the cost of cyclical fluctuations during the Great Moderation
is estimated at 0.60% of steady-state consumption.
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1 Introduction
The basic New-Keynesian model (Woodford, 2003; chapter 3) has been extended in
recent years to incorporate the endogenous determination of unemployment fluctua-
tions in the labor market.1 For instance, Walsh (2005) and Trigari (2009) combined
search frictions of the kind introduced in the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) frame-
work with sticky prices à la Calvo (1983). As a result, unemployment fluctuates due
to some real rigidity, i.e. the search and matching cost faced by the firm during the
hiring process.
Alternatively, this paper relies on Casares (2007, 2010) and Galí (2011) to incorpo-
rate unemployment fluctuations to the New-Keynesian model driven by sticky wages.
Wage rigidity explains why there are mismatches between labor supply (workers)
and labor demand (jobs) in the fraction of non-renegotiated labor contracts. In turn,
labor fluctuations are driven exclusively by changes in the level of employment which
might be considered a fair simplification of reality.2 Consequently, the household’s
disutility of work only varies when there are changes in the number of family mem-
bers employed. This difference becomes crucial when bringing the models to the data,
as unemployment fluctuations can be retrieved from the data whereas the difference
between total hours supplied and total hours demanded is not observable.
The model used in this paper extends that of Casares (2010) in two dimensions: (i)
it incorporates price and wage indexation rules, and (ii) it adds new sources of busi-
ness cycle fluctuations such as demand shocks and cost-push shocks. The difference
between this model and that of Galí (2011) is that unemployment is here determined at
a decentralized firm level, whereas Galí (2011) directly obtains unemployment as the
difference between aggregate labor demand and a measure of aggregate labor supply.
Another difference is that Galí (2011) maintains the assumption of market power of
households to determine wages, whereas this paper includes an intertemporal equation
to determine wages that match labor supply and labor demand.3
What are the empirical implications of having unemployment as excess supply of
labor in a New-Keynesian model? We address this question by following a Bayesian
econometric approach to estimate the unemployment model using US quarterly data
from the GreatModeration period (1984–2008). The estimation results provide a good
fit of the model to the data and suggest that the measures of price and wage stickiness
1 There have also been other remarkable extensions such as the open-economy framework (Galí and
Monacelli 2005), endogenous inertia from consumption habit formation, price/wage indexation rules or
investment adjustment costs (Smets and Wouters 2003, 2007; Christiano et al. 2005) and the introduction
of banking activities (Goodfriend and McCallum 2007; Christiano et al. 2008).
2 It is generally accepted that most variability of US total hours worked is explained by changes in the
number of employed people (extensive margin) whereas the number of hours at work (intensive margin) has
significantly less influence. Quoting the abstract of Cho and Cooley (1994): “Approximately one quarter of
the adjustment in total hours of employment over the business cycle represents adjustments in hours, while
the remainder is explained by changes in employment”.
3 Both models agree on taking effective employment from labor demand as usually assumed in Keynesian
textbook-type models (e.g., Abel et al. 2011, chapter 11).
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are quantitatively high and similar. We also estimate the model derived by Erceg et al.
(2000) as a natural benchmark for a comparison with a sticky-wage New-Keynesian
model that displays no unemployment fluctuations (so-called Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium, DSGE, models).4 Throughout the paper, EHL is the acronym
used to refer to the model based on the paper by Erceg et al. (2000) whereas CMV
is the name of the alternative sticky-wage model (CMV comes from the initials of
our last names). While the parameter estimates are rather similar across models, the
estimates obtained for Calvo probabilities suggest slightly shorter price stickiness and
longer wage stickiness in the CMVmodel compared to the EHLmodel. Moreover, the
estimate of the price inflation inertial component is lower in the CMV model than in
the EHLmodel, yielding weaker backward-looking inflation dynamics. By comparing
second moment statistics (standard deviations, correlations with output and first-order
autocorrelations) of output, price inflation, wage inflation and the nominal interest rate
obtained from actual data with those obtained in the two estimatedmodels, we observe
that both models provide a similar fit of the cyclical features characterizing the Great
Moderation period. More important, the estimated CMV is able to reproduce a large
extent of the second moment statistics of the US rate of unemployment.
Finally, this paper also makes a contribution to the calculation of the welfare cost of
business cycles. The analysis is carried out using the estimated parameters of the CMV
and EHLmodels. Our findings indicate that short-run fluctuations cause a welfare loss
in the US economy measured as a permanent 0.60% of consumption in the CMV
model and as a 0.31% of consumption in the EHLmodel. These values for the welfare
cost of business cycles are much higher than the one suggested by Lucas (2003).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the CMV model and compares
it with the EHL model. Section 3 introduces the estimation procedure and shows the
parameter estimates. Section 4 presents the empirical fit of the two models whereas
a robustness analysis of the CMV estimation results is carried out in Sect. 5. Next,
Sect. 6 computes the welfare cost of cyclical fluctuations estimated for the twomodels.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
This section describes a New-Keynesian model of unemployment fluctuations driven
by sticky wages similar to Casares (2010). Therefore, the labor market provides
employment fluctuations at the extensive margin. For that purpose, we assume indi-
visible labor hours as in Hansen (1985), so that workers spend a constant number of
daily hours at work. Thus, variations on total hours are exclusively driven by changes
in the number of employed workers.5
As in Merz (1995) and most papers of the Mortensen–Pissarides literature, the rep-
resentative household is a large family and their members pool differentiated labor
4 Other well-known DSGE models without unemployment are Christiano et al. (2005), and Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2007).
5 An inelastic supply of hours per worker has been assumed in Cooley and Hansen (1989), Merz (1995)
and, more recently, Blanchard and Galí (2007).
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income to be evenly split up in consumption shares in a way that they all are perfectly
insured against unemployment. Let us define h as the constant number of hours per
employee at work and nt (i) the number of household members working in some spe-
cific i-th firm. Thus, total hours worked at the i firm are nt (i)h. Assuming constant
relative risk aversion, the utility function for the representative household is given by
U (χt , ct , n
s
t (i)) = exp(χt )
[ct ]1−σ
1 − σ − 
1∫
0
[
nst (i)h
]1+γ
1 + γ di,
where χt is a consumption preference shock that follows an exogenous AR(1) process,
ct is current household’s consumption, nst (i)h are total hours supplied in the i firm,
and all the firms are collected in the unit interval. Defining  = h1+γ , we can
rewrite the utility function as
U (χt , ct , n
s
t (i)) = exp(χt )
[ct ]1−σ
1 − σ − 
1∫
0
[
nst (i)
]1+γ
1 + γ di. (1)
Regarding firms’ behavior, we consider the standard Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
setup of monopolistically competitive firms with a production technology that exhib-
its diminishing labor returns and constant capital. There are nominal rigidities in
the setting of both prices and wages, which are defined by their respective constant
probabilities as in Calvo (1983) and commonly assumed in the New-Keynesian liter-
ature. Following Casares (2010), wage setting is aimed at an intertemporal matching
between the number of job applicants supplied by the household and the number of
jobs demanded by the firms, provided a constant number of hours per job. It leads to
having unemployment as excess supply of labor at firm level. Let ηw be the Calvo-type
constant probability that the firm and the household cannot get together to negotiate a
new wage contract. If that is the case, the nominal wage is adjusted by the indexation
rule introduced below and the household is required to supply as many jobs as needed
to meet demand.6 Otherwise, with a probability 1 − ηw, the firm and the household
sit down to find the nominal wage that satisfies the following jobs-clearing condition7
Eηwt
∞∑
j=0
β jη jw
[
nst+ j (i) − ndt+ j (i)
]
= 0, (2)
where nst+ j (i) and n
d
t+ j (i) are respectively the quantity of jobs supplied and demanded
in the specific i firm, Eηwt is the rational expectation operator conditional to the lack
6 The arrival of a Calvo signal that impedes setting the jobs-clearing nominal wage would oblige the house-
hold to meet labor demand. It is a similar situation that faces the firm that cannot set the optimal price.
Thus, the effective amounts of output and labor are demand determined.
7 It should be noticed that in the case of fully-flexible nominal wages (ηw = 0), the jobs-clearing condition
(2) gives a perfect matching between labor supply and labor demand, nst (i) = ndt (i). Therefore, if wage
stickiness were dropped the model would deliver no unemployment fluctuations.
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of wage contract revisions in the future, and β∈(0, 1) is the discount factor. Firms
post demand for jobs and households supply a number of job seekers. The first-order
condition of the household for the supply of labor implies a constant elasticity of
substitution, 1/γ , across wage-specific industries. This condition can be expressed in
terms of log-deviations from steady-state values:
n̂st (i) =
1
γ
(
Ŵt (i) − Ŵt
) + n̂st , (3)
where Ŵt (i) is the log-deviation of the i-firm nominal wage from its steady-state level,
Ŵt =
∫ 1
0 Ŵt (i)di is the log-deviation of the aggregate nominal wage from its steady-
state level and n̂st =
∫ 1
0 n̂
s
t (i)di is the log-deviation of the aggregate labor supply
from the steady-state level of employment. Meanwhile, labor demand is the amount
of jobs required to produce as many units of output as demanded in the monopo-
listically competitive market. The production technology relates firm-specific output
to the demand for total hours of labor, ndt (i)h, and an AR(1) technology shock, zt ,
as follows: yt (i) = exp(zt )
[
ndt (i)h
]1−α
with 0 < α < 1. In log-deviations from
steady-state, we get:
ŷt (i) = (1 − α)̂ndt (i) + zt .
Combining the last expression with a log-linearized Dixit–Stiglitz demand curve com-
monly used in the New-Keynesian literature, we obtain
n̂dt (i) = −
θ
1 − α
(
P̂t (i) − P̂t
) + n̂t , (4)
where θ > 0 denotes the Dixit–Stiglitz elasticity of substitution and n̂t =
∫ 1
0 n̂
d
t (i)di
is the aggregate log-deviation of employment from its steady-state value.
Hence, jobs-clearing wages are set whenever market frictions permit labor at the
value that solves (2), provided current and future expressions of Eqs. (3) and (4), which
respectively govern the evolution of supply and demand for jobs. At the firm level, we
have
ut (i) = n̂st (i) − n̂dt (i),
that can be used for the aggregation across firms leading to the aggregate rate of
unemployment
ut =
1∫
0
ut (i)di = n̂st − n̂t .
Moreover, the system of Eqs. (2)–(4) brings a connection between pricing behavior
and wage setting at firm level (absent in standard Mortensen–Pissarides frameworks).
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The optimal price decision will be affected by the firm-specific circumstances (the
history of Calvo probabilities) yielding nominal wage differentiation across firms.
Meanwhile, nominal wages are set at different values depending upon particular pric-
ing conditions. For instance, after an expansionary demand shock firms that can price
optimally and hold nominal wages above the average wage will increase prices further
up because they are facing higher marginal costs. In addition, firm-specific wages will
be lower for a firm that has a higher price than the average because labor demand is
much weaker with high prices. In particular, it can be proved that there is a positive
relationship between the firm-specific relative optimal price and relative past wages,
P̂∗t (i) = P̂∗t + τ1
(
Ŵt−1(i) − Ŵt−1
)
, where the i index distinguishes firm-specific
variables from economy-wide averages. Also, there is a negative dependence between
relative wages and relative prices, Ŵt (i) = Ŵt − τ2
(
P̂t (i) − P̂t
)
.8
Unlike in Casares (2010), endogenous inertia on price and wage dynamics can be
added to improve the empirical fit of themodel. Thus, firms that cannot price optimally
will apply a price indexation rule built as a weighted reaction to the previous rate of
inflation and the steady-state rate of inflation plus a stochastic white-noise deviation:
Pt (i) = Pt−1(i)
[(
1 + π pt−1
)δp (1 + π p + υ pt )1−δp
]
,
where π pt−1 is economy-wide lagged inflation, π p is the steady-state rate of inflation
and υ pt is a price indexation shock. The parameter δp ∈ [0, 1] measures the weight
assigned to lagged inflation in the indexation rule. The particular setting δp = 0 elim-
inates the influence of lagged inflation on the price indexation rule and leaves out the
inertial dynamics of inflation.
Firms and households agree on a wage indexation rule for the nominal wage con-
tracts that cannot be renegotiated. Similarly to prices, the wage indexation rule reflects
a weighted reaction to lagged wage inflation and steady-state wage inflation plus a
stochastic white-noise deviation, as follows:
Wt (i) = Wt−1(i)
[(
1 + πwt−1
)δw (1 + πw + υwt )1−δw
]
,
where Wt (i) is the firm-specific nominal wage set in period t, πwt−1 is lagged wage
inflation, πw is the steady-state rate of wage inflation, and υwt is a white-noise wage
indexation shock. The parameter δw ∈ [0, 1] accommodates the weight of lagged
wage inflation in the indexation rule. If δw = 0, the indexation rule lacks from a
backward-looking pattern.
The complete CMV model can be expressed as the following linearized system of
equations:
8 Analytical expressions of τ1 and τ2 are found to be
τ1 = (1−βηp)ηw
(1−βηpηw)
(
1+ αθ1−α +τ2
(
1− (1−βηp )ηw1−βηpηw
)) and τ2 = γ θ(1−βηw)
(1−α)(1−βηwηp)
(
1+ τ1βηwγ θ
(1−α)
(
1− ηp (1−βηw)1−βηwηp
)) .
See Casares (2010) for the proof.
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π
p
t = δp1+βδp π
p
t−1 + β1+βδp Etπ
p
t+1 + κp1+βδp ψ̂t +
1−δp
1+βδp υ
p
t , (5)
ψ̂t = ŵt − (ŷt − n̂t ), (6)
πwt = δw1+βδw πwt−1 +
β
1+βδw Etπ
w
t+1 − κw1+βδw ut + 1−δw1+βδw υwt , (7)
ŵt = ŵt−1 + πwt − π pt , (8)
ŷt = (1 − α)̂nt + zt , (9)
ut = n̂st − n̂t , (10)
n̂st = 1γ (ŵt − σ ŷt + χt ), (11)
ŷt = Et ŷt+1 − 1σ
(
Rt − Etπt+1 − (1 − ρχ)χt
)
, (12)
Rt = (1 − μR)
[
μππ
p
t + μy(ŷt − ŷt )
] + μR Rt−1 + εRt , (13)(
α+γ
1−α + σ
)
ŷt = 1+γ1−α zt + χt . (14)
There are ten endogenous variables: the rate of price inflation, π pt ; the rate of wage
inflation, πwt ; the real marginal cost, ψ̂t ; the real wage, ŵt ; output, ŷt ; the unemploy-
ment rate, ut ; the average labor supply, n̂st ; the average (effective) labor demand, n̂t ;
the nominal interest rate, Rt ; and potential (natural-rate) output ŷt . Variables topped
with a hat symbol represent log-deviations from their respective steady-state levels,
whereas the remaining variables represent the difference in levels with respect to their
respective steady-state rates. Model variability comes from five exogenous shocks:
zt , χt , υ
p
t , υ
w
t , and ε
R
t . Only the technology shock (zt ) and the consumption prefer-
ence shock (χt ) are serially correlated; the other three (nominal) shocks are considered
white-noise independent processes. The quasi-slope coefficients κp and κw have the
following analytical expressions9:
κp = (1−βηp)(1−ηp)
ηp
(
1+ αθ1−α +τ2
(
1− ηw(1−βηp )1−βηpηw
))
and
κw = γ (1−βηw)(1−ηw)
ηw
(
1+τ1 βηwθγ1−α
(
1− ηp (1−βηw)1−βηpηw
)) .
Let us briefly describe the model Eqs. (5)–(14). The price-inflation equation, (5),
is a hybrid New-Keynesian Phillips curve that combines both backward and for-
ward-looking dynamics. It is obtained from log-linearizing the first-order condition
of the optimal price in a monopolistically competitive economy with Calvo-type
frictions on price setting and on jobs-clearing nominal wages. Equation (6) is a
log-linear definition of the real marginal cost where labor productivity is obtained
9 See the technical appendix of Casares (2010) for the proof.
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from the technology with diminishing marginal returns described above. Wage-infla-
tion dynamics are governed by Eq. (7), that resembles the seminal Phillips (1958)
curve because it displays a negative relationship between wage inflation and the
rate of unemployment. In a similar way to price inflation, there are both back-
ward and forward-looking components characterizing wage inflation dynamics, the
former due to the assumption of indexation on lagged wage inflation. Jobs-clear-
ing wage setting, Calvo-style sticky wages and a wage indexation rule result in
the wage inflation dynamics implied by Eq. (7). Actually, sticky wages are cru-
cial to explain unemployment fluctuations. Those non-renegotiated nominal wages
deliver a mismatch between the household’s supply of labor measured as the num-
ber of job seekers and the firm’s demand for labor measured as the number of jobs
posted, which after aggregation corresponds to our measure of the unemployment
rate.
Real wage dynamics are provided by Eq. (8). We assume a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion technology with constant capital and a technology shock. It is log-linearized in
Eq. (9). The rate of unemployment is endogenously defined by Eq. (10) as the log-
difference between average supply of labor and the average labor demand measured
as the number of jobs (extensive margin).
The labor supply function and the IS curve (Eqs. 11 and 12) are obtained from
the household’s optimizing behavior using the utility function specification (1). Con-
cretely, the combination of consumption and labor first-order equations together with
the market-clearing condition that equates consumption and output, leads to the labor
supply Eq. (11). The IS-type Eq. (12) is obtained from log-linearizing the consumption
Euler equation.
Next, monetary policy follows a Taylor (1993)-type rule with a smoothing com-
ponent and an interest-rate shock described in Eq. (13). The nominal interest rate
changes endogenously in response to changes in the rate of inflation, the output gap
and the lagged nominal interest rate. The output gap is defined as the log-devia-
tion between current output and potential (natural-rate) output. Finally, fluctuations
of potential output are obtained from Eq. (14), which provides deviations of output
from steady state if the economy were released from nominal rigidities, i.e. setting
ηp = ηw = 0.
2.1 A comparison with EHL (2000)
EHL (2000) introduce sticky wages in a New-Keynesian model. Staggered nomi-
nal wages reproduce the constant probability scheme of Calvo (1983)-type contracts
that are applied to pricing decisions. Thus, there are both sticky prices and sticky
wages à la Calvo (1983). In spite of having wage rigidities, the EHL model is a
DSGE model. That is, the labor market is at equilibrium in every period. Households
own a differentiated labor service that gives them market power to set the nominal
wage. Letting ηw be the Calvo probability that disables optimal wage setting and
adding a wage indexation rule identical to the CMV model described above, fluctua-
tions of wage inflation in the EHL model are given by the following forward-looking
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equation:
πwt = δw1+βδw πwt−1 +
β
1+βδw Etπ
w
t+1 + (1−ηw)(1−βηw)ηw(1+γ θ f )(1+βδw)
(̂
mrst − ŵt
) + 1−δw1+βδw υwt ,
(15)
where m̂rst − ŵt is the log-difference between the household’s marginal rate of sub-
stitution (mrs) and the real wage, and θ f is the labor demand elasticity of substitu-
tion.
Remarkably, the CMV model features a semi-loglinear relationship between the
rate of unemployment and the gap that drives wage inflation fluctuations in the EHL
model, m̂rst − ŵt . Hence, inserting Eq. (11) that determines fluctuations of the labor
supply in the unemployment definition (10), it yields
ut = 1
γ
(ŵt − σ ŷt + χt ) − n̂t . (16)
Meanwhile, the expression for m̂rst implied by the utility function specified above
is10
m̂rst = γ n̂t − χt + σ ŷt . (17)
Comparing (16) and (17), it is straightforward to obtain that
m̂rst − ŵt = −γ ut , (18)
which obviously is only a valid statement for the CMV model, since the EHL model
lacks unemployment.
The relationship between unemployment and the mrs-wage gap implied by (18)
can be substituted in the wage inflation equation of the CMVmodel, Eq. (7), to obtain
πwt = δw1+βδw πwt−1 +
β
1+βδw Etπ
w
t+1 + κw1+βδw 1γ
(̂
mrst − ŵt
) + 1−δw1+βδw υwt . (19)
Hence, the labormarket structures of the CMVand EHLmodels are different in two
aspects. First, the interpretation of aggregate labor fluctuations, n̂t , is different. Thus,
n̂t represents total number of hours at work in the EHLmodel whereas it does the total
number of employed workers (employment) in the CMV model. The negative value
of the labor gap in the EHL model, − (̂nt − n̂t), brings the log difference between
10 Provided the same specification for the instantaneous utility function used in the CMV model (see
expression 1 in Sect. 2), the marginal rate of substitution between the supply of labor to the i-th firm and
consumption is:
mrst (i) = n
s
t (i)
γ
exp(χt )c
−σ
t
.
Log-linearizing this expression, using the equilibrium condition ĉt = ŷt , and aggregating across firms lead
to the expression shown in the main text.
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effective total hours and the amount that would result in an economy with flexible
prices and flexible wages, and might provide a close equivalent to unemployment.11
Second, the analytical expression that governs wage inflation dynamics is different.
Comparing the EHL Eq. (15) with its jobs-clearing counterpart (19), it can be noticed
how the slope coefficient in (19) depends upon the value of κw which collects the
connections between pricing and wage setting. Such connections are absent in the
EHL model.
Regarding the price inflation equation, firms set prices under Calvo nominal
rigidities in both models. When receiving the right market signal, the optimal price
depends positively on both the aggregate price level and the realmarginal cost. Tomake
the version of the EHL model used here comparable to the CMVmodel, it is assumed
constant capital and the same price indexation rule for the cases of non-optimal pric-
ing. When abstracting from variable capital, the real marginal cost is firm-specific
which implies a flatter slope of the Phillips curve (Sbordone 2002). Thus, the Phillips
curve that drives inflation dynamics in the version of the EHL model with constant
capital and a price indexation rule is
π
p
t = δp1+βδp π
p
t−1 + β1+βδp Etπ
p
t+1 + (1−ηp)(1−βηp)ηp(1+αθ/(1−α))(1+βδp) ψ̂t +
1−δp
1+βδp υ
p
t . (20)
The only difference with the Phillips curve of the CMVmodel is the slope coefficient.
By comparing the slopes of (5) and (20) and noting the analytical expression that
determines κp, we can conclude that the slope coefficient is lower in the CMVmodel.
Therefore, the reaction of inflation to changes in the real marginal cost is smaller in
the CMV model. This difference can again be explained by the connections between
wage setting and price setting that are present in the CMV model. In short, any price
increase that comes after a rise of the real marginal cost would reduce firm-specific
labor demand and, subsequently, the jobs-clearing nominal wage. A falling nominal
wage would partially compensate the initial increase in the real marginal cost in a way
that would cut the price hike. In turn, the price level and inflation would have a weaker
response to changes in the aggregate real marginal cost (lower slope coefficient).
3 Estimation
3.1 Data and estimation procedure
The CMV and EHL models are estimated using US quarterly data from the Great
Moderation period (1984:1Q–2008:2Q). Indeed, this sample period has been char-
acterized by mild fluctuations of most (both real and nominal) aggregate variables
(see Stock and Watson 2002, among others). Thus, we would expect not to suffer
from any important misspecification sources, such as parameter instability in both the
private sector—for instance, Calvo probabilities (Moreno 2004)—and the monetary
policy reactions to inflation or output (Canova 2009). Indeed, some authors argue that
a sound monetary policy implementation is the main factor behind the low aggre-
11 This possibility was suggested by one of the referees and it is examined below in Sect. 4.
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gate volatility since the mid-1980’s (Clarida et al. 1994). In the robustness exercises
conducted below, we compare the results obtained during the Great Moderation with
those found in the pre-Volcker period.
The data set includes five time series: the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the
price inflation rate obtained from the implicit GDP deflator, the wage inflation rate
obtained from nominal compensation per hour, the 3-month Treasury bill rate and
the unemployment rate. Real GDP was logged and linearly detrended to extract the
cyclical component of output. The data were retrieved from the Federal Reserve of
St. Louis (FRED) database. In the robustness section below, we also show that results
are not specific to the detrending method (or to the use of output growth instead of
detrended output) as well as to the inclusion of a measure of employment in the set of
variables.
We estimate the two alternative models using a now-standard two-step Bayesian
procedure.12 In the first step, the log posterior function is maximized in a way that
combines the prior information of the parameters with the empirical likelihood of
the data. In a second step, we perform the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to compute
the posterior distribution associated with each estimated parameter. Notice that the
slope coefficients in the price and wage inflation equations are implicit functions of
the undetermined coefficients τ1 and τ2. These coefficients can be analytically solved
through a non-linear two-equation system.We pick the positive values associated with
these solutions, as implied by theory.
The selection of prior distributions for the model parameters is based on similar
related studies (Smets andWouters 2007; Gertler et al. 2008). The priors for the utility
function parameters σ and γ are set at 2.0 and 4.0, respectively; with standard devia-
tions 0.1 and 0.5, respectively. The prior for the elasticity of substitution across goods
(θ) is set at 6, which implies a 20% mark-up in steady state. The prior distribution
for the two indexation parameters in the price and wage inflation equations (δp, δw)
is a normal with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.1. Exactly the same priors are
chosen for the Calvo probabilities of price and wage adjustment (ηp, ηw), implying
an average duration of both wage and price contracts of two quarters. The priors of the
production function parameter and the subjective time discount factor (α and β) are the
standard values of 0.36 and 0.99, respectively; with standard deviation of 0.01. Follow-
ing Gertler et al. (2008), the priors of monetary policy parameters are set at 0.75 for the
endogenous persistence parameter, 1.7 for the long-run response to inflation and 0.125
for the response to cyclical output. Also following their priors, the standard deviations
of the innovations to the shocks come from an inverse gamma distribution with mean
and standard deviation 0.15, whereas the autocorrelation parameters of the technology
and preference shocks are set at 0.5, with standard deviation 0.1. A sensitivity analysis
is carried out in Sect. 5.1 below by using looser prior distributions.
As is standard in the literature, we select the local stable equilibrium as the model
solution. We thus disregard all the non-local explosive equilibria. Cochrane (2010)
has pointed out that these equilibria should be taken into account, but we restrict our
attention to the stable equilibrium, which seems the most sensible one in terms of both
12 See, for instance, Fernández-Villaverde (2010), and references therein, for an excellent review of the
literature on estimation of DSGE models using Bayesian techniques.
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Table 1 Priors and estimated posteriors of structural parameters
Priors Posteriors
Distr Mean Std D. CMV EHL
Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
σ Normal 2.00 0.10 2.11 1.95 2.25 2.11 1.95 2.27
γ Normal 4.00 0.50 4.66 3.99 5.35 4.34 3.78 4.91
θ Normal 6.00 0.50 6.18 5.45 6.83 6.30 5.81 6.85
θ f Normal 4.00 0.50 4.18 3.62 5.02
α Normal 0.36 0.01 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.37
β Normal 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.00
δp Normal 0.50 0.10 0.47 0.36 0.55 0.59 0.48 0.69
δw Normal 0.50 0.10 0.38 0.29 0.48 0.33 0.24 0.44
ηp Beta 0.50 0.10 0.82 0.78 0.86 0.88 0.84 0.91
ηw Beta 0.50 0.10 0.85 0.81 0.88 0.82 0.77 0.87
μr Beta 0.75 0.10 0.84 0.80 0.87 0.83 0.79 0.86
μπ Normal 1.70 0.30 2.00 1.74 2.36 2.02 1.67 2.29
μy Gamma 0.125 0.10 0.70 0.51 0.95 0.35 0.23 0.50
ρχ Beta 0.50 0.15 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.90 0.87 0.93
ρz Beta 0.50 0.15 0.87 0.83 0.92 0.91 0.87 0.93
σp Inv Gamma 0.15 0.15 0.43 0.35 0.53 0.60 0.43 0.76
σw Inv Gamma 0.15 0.15 1.12 0.90 1.33 0.95 0.79 1.12
σr Inv Gamma 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.16
σz Inv Gamma 0.15 0.15 0.44 0.38 0.49 0.45 0.39 0.49
σχ Inv Gamma 0.15 0.15 2.46 1.76 3.08 1.76 1.44 1.98
our model -which is in deviations from steady-states- and both country and sample
of analysis considered. In case of equilibrium indeterminacy, the estimation proce-
dure selects the solution associated with the smallest roots (generalized eigenvalues),
known as the MOD solution, suggested by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and used by
McCallum (2004), among other authors. Finally, we note that monetary policy param-
eters are well identified in the context of this standard model solution, given that the
monetary policy shock is an i.i.d. process and no stochastic intercept appears in the
policy rule.
3.2 Estimation results
Table 1 reports the prior and posterior distributions of each parameter in our proposed
CMV model, together with the 5 and 95% quantiles of the posterior distribution. This
table also compares the posterior distributions with those obtained -using the same
priors- from the estimated version of the EHL model described in Sect. 2.
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Table 1 shows that all parameter estimates are statistically different from zero, with
statistical confidence bands varying in size, but small overall. In several cases, the pos-
teriors are close to the priors, where in some instances, they are significantly distant. In
particular, the posterior of the “deep” parameters (preferences, technology and market
structure) are very close to their respective priors. The estimate for the curvature of
the consumption utility function σ is 2.11, showing a moderate sensibility of output to
changes in the real interest rate. As for the labor disutility parameter γ, it is estimated
at 4.66, implying a relatively low labor supply elasticity consistent with most micro-
economic evidence. The parameter measuring the Dixit–Stiglitz demand elasticity, θ,
is estimated to be 6.18. The capital share in the production function, α, matches the
prior level of 0.36, the same as the time discount parameter, β, which remains at 0.99.
We find values of the indexation parameters in the price and wage inflation equations
below, but close to the prior value of 0.50. In contrast, the parameters that measure
the Calvo-type price and wage rigidities are estimated to be around 0.84, much higher
than the 0.5 prior, implying high price and wage rigidities.13 These values for the
Calvo parameters are somewhat higher than those obtained for the Great Moderation
by Smets and Wouters (2007) in their New-Keynesian model with sticky wages à
la EHL, i.e. without unemployment.14 The price adjustment parameter is similar to
that estimated by Gertler et al. (2008), whereas our estimate of the wage adjustment
parameter is quite higher (they estimate it to be 0.71). The values obtained for the
monetary policy parameters are in line with those reported in the literature for the
period considered: a high coefficient on the lagged interest rate (0.84), a large interest
rate response to inflation (2.00) and a moderate response to output (0.70). Finally, the
size of the innovations to the consumption preference shock (that shifts the IS curve)
is significantly higher than those of the other shocks.
Table 1 also shows that the parameter estimates of the CMVmodel are quite similar
to those obtained in the estimationof theEHLmodel.15 Indeed, the confidence intervals
associated with each parameter estimate, obtained from the two models, always over-
lap except for the output gap coefficient in the policy rule,μy, showing that parameter
estimate differences between the two models are not statistically significant.16 Thus,
13 Nevertheless, sticky prices do not imply firm-specific constant prices in the models. It should be recalled
that firms that cannot price optimally will adjust current prices by applying the indexation rule that takes
into account lagged inflation, the steady-state rate of inflation and the price indexation shock. With a similar
wage indexation rule, nominal wages also change every period. A greater extent of nominal rigidities result
in a larger fraction of price/wage adjustment that follow the indexation rule.
14 Apparently, a large extent of both price and wage stickiness might seem counterintuitive during the Great
Moderation period. However, the low-inflation scenario featuring this period would reduce variability on
relative prices and, therefore, the average cost of deviating from optimal pricing. Thus, the presence of
menu costs or information costs could more easily postpone the search of the optimal price during the Great
Moderation. The high estimates of ηp found here may capture this effect.
15 In the estimation of the EHL model, the US time series of total hours was used in replacement of the
rate of unemployment, which is absent in that model. Thus, the time series of “Hours of All Persons in the
Nonfarm Business Sector” was logged and linearly detrended to extract the business cycle component that
was added to the set of observable variables. By doing so, we have the same number of observable variables
and shocks across models.
16 We carry out below in Sect. 5.1 a sensitivity analysis of the results from the estimation of the two models
by considering looser prior distributions. Parameter estimates in the CMVmodel are rather robust. However,
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the NewKeynesian Phillips curve in the two models (Eq. 5 in the CMVmodel and Eq.
20 for the EHL model) displays a lagged inflation coefficient with a lower value than
that of the expected next period’s inflation coefficient; the lagged inflation coefficient
is around 1/3 and the expected inflation coefficient is near 2/3. Therefore, inflation
dynamics aremore forward-looking than backward-looking in the two estimatedmod-
els. Moreover, model estimates imply that the Phillips curve coefficients on the gap
between the real wage and labor productivity are almost identical across models (i.e.
these are 0.0029 and 0.0024 in the CMV and EHL models, respectively).
Apart from these similarities, there are some differences that deserve discussion.
First, the estimate of the backward-looking parameter δp for inflation dynamics is
lower in our proposed CMVmodel (0.47) compared to the figure obtained in the EHL
model (0.59). Second, the EHL estimates imply somewhat lower wage rigidities, but
higher price rigidities. Third, the estimates of the monetary policy rule parameters are
rather similar, with a higher output response in theCMVmodel. Fourth, the slope of the
comparable wage inflation equations is rather higher in Eq. 19 from the CMV model
(0.0093) than in Eq. 15 from the EHL model (0.0022), which indicates a stronger
responsiveness of wage inflation to the m̂rst − ŵt gap in the CMVmodel. Finally, the
standard deviation of the innovations to price inflation shocks is smaller in the CMV
model, whereas the standard deviation of the innovations to consumption preference
(IS) shocks is significantly lower in the EHL model.
4 Empirical fit
This section compares the performance of CMV and EHL models along three dimen-
sions. First, we analyze the ability of the two models to reproduce business cycle sta-
tistics obtained from actual data. Second, we study the contribution of each structural
shock in explaining the total variance decomposition of macroeconomic variables.
Finally, we carry out an impulse-response analysis.
4.1 Second-moment statistics
Table 2 shows second-moment statistics obtained from actual US data (first panel),
and the ones found in both the estimated CMV (second panel) and EHL (third panel)
models. The fourth panel exhibits the second-moment statistics obtained from the esti-
mated CMVwith themore diffuse prior distributions discussed in Sect. 5.1. In general,
the two models do a good job in reproducing the cyclical features of the data. Thus,
they both capture the volatility of output, the nominal interest rate and wage inflation
and the low volatility of price inflation. Moreover, the two models replicate reason-
ably well the first-order autocorrelation of all variables. However, the CMV model
Footnote 16 continued
EHL model estimates substantially change under the alternative priors. We have considered the tight prior
distribution as the benchmark case so as to focus on the different dynamic features exhibited by the CMV
and EHL models. In this way we expect to distinguish those intrinsic different dynamics featured by the
two models from those driven by different parameter estimates.
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Table 2 Business cycle statistics: Linear Trend
ŷ π p πw R u −(n − n)
US data, 1984:1–2008:2
Standard deviation 1.60 0.25 0.60 0.54 1.06 −
Correlation with output 1.0 0.03 0.25 0.23 −0.59 −
Autocorrelation 0.95 0.48 0.15 0.97 0.98 −
Estimated CMV model
Standard deviation 1.30 0.26 0.66 0.41 0.98
Correlation with output 1.0 0.11 0.18 0.15 −0.48
Autocorrelation 0.89 0.51 0.31 0.91 0.72
Estimated EHL model
Standard deviation 1.30 0.28 0.63 0.35 − 1.30
Correlation with output 1.0 −0.19 0.04 −0.21 − −0.58
Autocorrelation 0.88 0.56 0.29 0.89 − 0.83
Estimated CMV model with more diffuse priors
Standard deviation 1.44 0.28 0.66 0.42 0.91
Correlation with output 1.0 −0.01 0.12 −0.02 −0.42
Autocorrelation 0.92 0.58 0.29 0.93 0.77
outperforms the EHL model in two important dimensions. First, the CMV reproduces
the mildly cyclical correlation of the nominal interest rate and price inflation, while
the EHL model gives a slightly negative correlation of these variables with output.
Second, and more importantly, the CMV model endogenously explains unemploy-
ment fluctuations, unlike the EHL model. Indeed, the CMV model does a good job
in reproducing business cycle statistics on volatility and correlation with output that
feature US unemployment rate. Perhaps, the only significant discrepancy is that the
CMV model underpredicts a bit the observed unemployment rate persistence.
The EHL model provides a labor gap measure, which is arguably comparable to
actual unemployment data. Thus, the negative labor gap obtained from the estimated
EHLmodel is more volatile than US unemployment rate but provides a goodmatching
for the negative correlation with output and the serial autocorrelation of unemploy-
ment.
4.2 Variance decomposition
Tables 3 and 4 show the long-run variance decomposition (100-period ahead fore-
cast) for the CMV and the EHL models, respectively. The two models show similar
sources of variability in business cycle fluctuations. Thus, around 60% of output var-
iability is driven by IS shocks, χ, whereas productivity innovations, z, explain nearly
1/3 of output fluctuations in both models. Monetary policy (interest-rate) shocks take
between 6% (CMV model) and 9% (EHL model) of the output variance decomposi-
tion and nominal shocks on prices and wages play a very minor role in both cases.
Potential output only varies with real shocks as the models feature nominal shocks are
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Table 3 Variance decomposition in estimated CMV model
Shocks
υ p υw εR z χ
Output 0.0201 0.0034 0.0612 0.3164 0.5988
Potential output 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6078 0.3922
Labor supply 0.0104 0.0818 0.0104 0.0722 0.8252
Employment (jobs) 0.0281 0.0049 0.0866 0.0847 0.7957
Unemployment 0.0610 0.2017 0.3626 0.0637 0.3109
Real wage 0.2054 0.6277 0.0502 0.0287 0.0879
Price inflation 0.7624 0.0479 0.0102 0.0313 0.1482
Wage inflation 0.0125 0.9002 0.0277 0.0045 0.0551
Nominal interest rate 0.0722 0.0129 0.2221 0.1266 0.5662
Table 4 Variance decomposition in estimated EHL model
Shocks
υ p υw εR z χ
Output 0.0603 0.0392 0.0891 0.2815 0.5298
Potential output 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7838 0.2162
Labor (Total hours) 0.0753 0.0477 0.1109 0.1089 0.6572
Labor gap 0.2411 0.0074 0.2026 0.1400 0.4089
MRS 0.1844 0.1162 0.2729 0.0475 0.3790
Real wage 0.2582 0.7056 0.0044 0.0230 0.0088
Price inflation 0.8256 0.1201 0.0029 0.0248 0.0266
Wage inflation 0.0055 0.9808 0.0028 0.0017 0.0092
Nominal interest rate 0.2143 0.0781 0.3131 0.1231 0.2714
neutral with fully-flexible prices and wages. Technology shocks are the main source
of potential output fluctuations with variance shares between 60% (CMV model) and
80% (EHL model). Consumption preference (IS) shocks explain the rest of potential
output variability through their effect on labor supply shifts. Also in both models, the
variability of effective employment is mostly explained by demand-side shocks such
as innovations in the IS curves and, in a much lower extent, by technology innovations
and interest-rate shocks. Meanwhile, price and wage inflation variances are almost
entirely determined by their own cost-push shocks (υ p and υw, respectively).
The models disagree in the variance decomposition of the nominal interest rate.
Thus, the movements in the nominal interest rate are explained by IS innovations
(57%), monetary policy shocks (22%) and technology shocks (13%) in the CMV
model. By contrast, IS shocks have a much lower share (27%) as sources of variability
of nominal interest rate in the EHL model, whereas price indexation shocks also take
a significant share (21%).
Finally, the variance decomposition of unemployment fluctuations is only reported
in the CMV. The EHL model includes the labor gap, n̂t − n̂t , for a comparison.
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Fig. 1 Impulse response functions from one standard deviation of a price indexation shock (υ p), a wage
indexation shock (υw), an IS shock (χ), a monetary policy shock (εR), and a technology shock (z)
As Table 3 shows, the CMV model reveals quite a dispersion in the sources of unem-
ployment variability. The results indicate that much of the unemployment fluctuations
are due to shocks that shift the aggregate demand. Thus, IS shocks are responsible
for 31% of unemployment variability and monetary policy shocks justify 36% of
changes in unemployment. Regarding supply-side innovations, cost-push shocks on
wage setting, υw, explain other 20% of fluctuations of unemployment, whereas both
technology innovations and cost-push shocks on price setting, υ p, only contribute to
explain 6% of unemployment variability. In the EHL model (Table 4), the variability
of the labor gap, n̂t − n̂t , is more influenced by price indexation shocks while wage
indexation shocks give a negligible share in its variance decomposition. Technology
shocks take 14% of the variance decomposition of the labor gap, more than doubling
that of unemployment in the CMV model.
4.3 Impulse-response functions
Figure 1 shows the estimated impulse responses to the five structural shocks in the
CMV and EHLmodels. The shock impulse has been normalized to one standard devi-
ation of the innovation in all cases. The responses of output are very similar in reaction
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to all shocks except for the price indexation shock, which results in a fall of output that
is half in size in the CMVmodel compared to the EHLmodel. Some other differences
across models can be noticed when observing Fig. 1. For instance, the responses of
price inflation to a wage inflation shock, an IS shock, an interest-rate shock and a
technology shock are larger in the CMV model than in the EHL model. These dif-
ferences are translated to more aggressive reactions of the nominal interest rate (as
implied by the Taylor-type policy rule) in the CMV model. More importantly, the
CMV model explains how unemployment reacts to alternative shocks. As expected,
cost-push shocks on either prices and wages result in an increase of unemployment,
a positive IS shock reduces it and a contractionary monetary policy shock brings a
higher rate of unemployment as the nominal interest rate rises. In line with the empir-
ical findings of Galí (1999), there is a countercyclical response of the unemployment
rate after a positive productivity shock, though it quickly returns to the steady-state rate
as shown in Fig. 1. Finally, unemployment in the CMV model and the negative labor
gap in the EHL model show a pattern of close comovement in the responses to tech-
nology, IS, and interest-rate shocks (see last column of Fig. 1). With cost-push shocks,
unemployment reacts more aggressively than the labor gap after a wage indexation
shocks, whereas the opposite is found after a price indexation shock.
5 Robustness analysis
This section analyzes the robustness of the empirical evidence reported in the previ-
ous section along four important dimensions. First, we re-estimate the two models by
imposing looser prior distributions. Second, we consider three additional alternative
measures for the cyclical component of output. Third, we include US data of payroll
employment in addition to the five time series studied in the estimation of the CMV
model. Finally, we estimate the model using data from the pre-Volcker period and
compare the estimation results with those found for the Great Moderation.
5.1 Alternative priors
This subsection studies the sensitivity of estimation results to more diffuse prior dis-
tributions. More precisely, we consider less tight priors for those parameters whose
posteriormean estimates in the benchmark case are close to their respective priormean,
such as the relative risk aversion parameter, σ , and the Frisch elasticity parameter, γ .
Moreover, we consider a wider prior distribution range for parameters characterizing
shock processes. Table 5 shows the estimation results for the two models. Parameter
estimates from the CMV model are in general robust to the alternative prior distribu-
tions. In particular, the Calvo probabilities and indexation parameters, as well as the
policy rule parameters are not sensitive to the alternative priors. However, the esti-
mates of these parameters in the EHLmodel turn out to be quite sensitive to the choice
of priors.
The second-moment statistics obtained from the estimated CMVwith the more dif-
fuse prior distributions are displayed in the bottom panel of Table 2. There are rather
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Table 5 Estimated posteriors of structural parameters with alternative priors
Priors Posteriors
Distr Mean Std D. CMV EHL
Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
σ Normal 2.00 0.50 3.12 2.49 3.73 1.89 1.30 2.49
γ Normal 4.00 0.75 5.29 4.31 6.22 4.04 2.90 5.18
θ Normal 6.00 1.50 7.32 5.08 9.64 6.45 4.08 8.77
θ f Normal 4.00 1.50 3.98 1.59 6.49
α Normal 0.36 0.05 0.28 0.20 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.37
β Normal 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.97 1.01 0.99 0.97 1.00
δp Normal 0.50 0.15 0.48 0.33 0.61 0.60 0.47 0.73
δw Normal 0.50 0.15 0.32 0.16 0.49 0.60 0.47 0.71
ηp Beta 0.50 0.10 0.82 0.77 0.87 0.59 0.52 0.67
ηw Beta 0.50 0.10 0.86 0.82 0.89 0.83 0.77 0.90
μr Beta 0.75 0.10 0.86 0.82 0.89 0.83 0.78 0.88
μπ Normal 1.70 0.30 1.86 1.46 2.23 1.11 0.80 1.41
μy Gamma 0.125 0.10 0.64 0.35 0.92 0.62 0.34 0.89
ρχ Beta 0.50 0.20 0.93 0.91 0.96 0.92 0.89 0.97
ρz Beta 0.50 0.20 0.91 0.85 0.97 0.96 0.91 1.00
σp Inv Gamma 0.15 2.00 0.44 0.30 0.57 1.13 0.71 1.49
σw Inv Gamma 0.15 2.00 1.02 0.70 1.33 1.41 0.93 1.83
σr Inv Gamma 0.15 2.00 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.16
σz Inv Gamma 0.15 2.00 0.50 0.39 0.60 0.75 0.66 0.84
σχ Inv Gamma 0.15 2.00 2.57 1.85 3.20 3.14 2.21 4.03
The prior distributions used in the estimation procedures of the two models are identical, but the standard
deviation of the prior distribution associatedwith parameterα.More precise, the standard deviation assumed
for the EHL is the one considered in the benchmark case because a less tight prior distribution, as the one
considered in the CMV model, leads to unreasonable estimates of α and many other parameters
similar to those obtained under the benchmark prior distributions, which are displayed
in the second panel of Table 2.
5.2 Output filters
As emphasized byCanova and Ferroni (2009), among other authors, the dynamic prop-
erties of estimated macro models can vary depending on the filter used for output. We
now show that our parameter estimates are robust across filtering schemes. Table 6 dis-
plays the parameter estimates of the CMVmodel under three alternative definitions of
cyclical output. The first definition is obtained implementing a quadratic-trend decom-
position. The second is given by Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter. Finally, the third con-
siders directly the rate of growth of real GDP, which also captures the high frequency
fluctuations of output. The estimation results are very similar for the four definitions of
123
414 SERIEs (2012) 3:395–422
Table 6 Estimates under alternative cyclical components of output
Quadratic HP Growth rate
Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
σ 2.11 1.98 2.24 2.09 1.94 2.27 2.08 1.97 2.29
γ 4.52 3.81 4.99 4.76 4.09 5.40 4.72 4.13 5.34
θ 6.20 5.39 6.92 6.09 5.39 6.86 6.05 5.35 6.79
α 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.37
β 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.00
δp 0.45 0.33 0.54 0.44 0.35 0.51 0.47 0.37 0.60
δw 0.36 0.26 0.43 0.41 0.29 0.53 0.36 0.24 0.50
ηp 0.82 0.79 0.87 0.82 0.78 0.85 0.82 0.78 0.86
ηw 0.85 0.82 0.88 0.84 0.81 0.87 0.86 0.83 0.89
μr 0.85 0.82 0.88 0.84 0.81 0.88 0.86 0.83 0.88
μπ 1.97 1.55 2.48 1.86 1.58 2.21 1.98 1.66 2.32
μy 0.73 0.47 0.94 0.70 0.46 0.89 0.73 0.46 0.99
ρχ 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.93 0.90 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.96
ρz 0.85 0.78 0.91 0.81 0.77 0.86 0.89 0.83 0.93
σp 0.41 0.34 0.50 0.39 0.33 0.45 0.44 0.33 0.57
σw 1.07 0.90 1.30 1.21 0.90 1.53 1.07 0.82 1.33
σr 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.21 0.16 0.13 0.18
σz 0.45 0.36 0.51 0.41 0.36 0.47 0.49 0.40 0.57
σχ 2.38 1.69 2.84 2.14 1.65 2.54 2.37 1.74 2.81
output cyclical component studied. Moreover, the cyclical features of the CMVmodel
analyzed in Sect. 4 are also robust to the use of alternative cyclical components.17
5.3 Introducing employment and a labor supply shock
Thebenchmark estimation of theCMVmodel considers only the rate of unemployment
time series as the single variable describing labor market capacity. By contrast, the
EHL model estimation includes a measure of labor (total hours) instead of unemploy-
ment rate. In this subsection, we consider US data of payroll employment in addition
to the five time series studied in the benchmark case. The inclusion of an additional
time series forces us to introduce an additional shock.18 In particular, we introduce
an autocorrelated labor supply (disutility) shock, ζt , that would appear in equations
17 Not shown due to space limitations. These results are available upon request from the authors.
18 As discussed by Ireland (2004), there is a long-standing tradition of introducing additional disturbances
into DSGE models until the number of shocks equals the number of data series used in estimation. The
reason is that models of this type are quite stylized and introduce fewer shocks than observable variables,
which implies that models are stochastically singular. That is, the model implies that certain combinations
of endogenous variables are deterministic. If these combinations do not hold in the data, any approach that
attempts to estimate the complete model will fail.
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Table 7 Estimation results using Employment time series
Priors Posteriors
Distr Mean Std D. CMV
Mean 5% 95%
σ Normal 2.00 0.10 2.11 1.97 2.21
γ Normal 4.00 0.50 5.64 5.23 6.36
θ Normal 6.00 0.50 6.30 5.58 7.37
α Normal 0.36 0.01 0.35 0.34 0.37
β Normal 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.97 1.01
δp Normal 0.50 0.10 0.57 0.44 0.73
δw Normal 0.50 0.10 0.39 0.31 0.48
ηp Beta 0.50 0.10 0.78 0.73 0.82
ηw Beta 0.50 0.10 0.83 0.81 0.87
μr Beta 0.75 0.10 0.80 0.77 0.83
μπ Normal 1.70 0.30 1.78 1.60 2.13
μy Gamma 0.125 0.10 0.57 0.36 0.72
ρχ Beta 0.50 0.15 0.89 0.86 0.91
ρz Beta 0.50 0.15 0.94 0.91 0.96
ρζ Beta 0.50 0.15 0.96 0.95 0.98
σp Inv Gamma 0.15 0.15 0.60 0.38 0.89
σy Inv Gamma 0.15 0.15 1.12 0.92 1.23
σr Inv Gamma 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.19
σz Inv Gamma 0.15 0.15 0.44 0.39 0.48
σχ Inv Gamma 0.15 0.15 1.58 1.31 1.87
σζ Inv Gamma 0.15 0.15 1.85 1.61 2.05
governing fluctuations on both labor supply, (11), and potential output, (14). Table 7
shows the estimation results using the set of six time series that includes both the rate
of unemployment and payroll employment. They are again quantitatively similar to
those obtained in the benchmark model reported in Table 1.
5.4 Pre-Volcker period (1957:Q1–1979:Q2)
This subsection analyzes the pre-Volcker period. Table 8 shows the estimation results
in the CMV and EHL models. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), the pre-Volcker
sample starts in 1957 and finishes right before the arrival of Paul Volcker as Federal
Reserve chairman, who introduced changes in the operating procedures at the Fed.
When comparing these estimation results with those obtained for the Great Modera-
tion data set, it is useful to distinguish four sets of parameters. The first is composed by
the so called deep parameters (σ, γ, θ, θehl , α and β). The estimates are robust across
models and samples. The second set is formed by the indexation parameters (δp and
δw) and Calvo parameters (ηp and ηw). The indexation parameters were higher in the
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Table 8 Estimation results for the pre-Volcker period (1957–1979)
Priors Posteriors
Distr. Mean Std D. CMV EHL
Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
σ Normal 2.00 0.10 2.00 1.83 2.14 1.99 1.87 2.16
γ Normal 4.00 0.50 4.04 3.24 4.68 4.14 3.39 5.13
θ Normal 6.00 0.50 6.31 5.05 7.16 5.95 5.43 6.63
θ f Normal 4.00 0.50 3.87 2.99 4.46
α Normal 0.36 0.01 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.36
β Normal 0.99 0.01 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.99
δp Normal 0.50 0.10 0.61 0.49 0.76 0.55 0.44 0.67
δw Normal 0.50 0.10 0.52 0.46 0.61 0.57 0.48 0.68
ηp Beta 0.50 0.10 0.71 0.63 0.79 0.58 0.52 0.62
ηw Beta 0.50 0.10 0.92 0.89 0.95 0.85 0.84 0.85
μr Beta 0.75 0.10 0.76 0.70 0.82 0.84 0.80 0.87
μπ Normal 1.70 0.30 0.89 0.66 1.11 1.03 0.82 1.28
μy Gamma 0.5/4 0.10 0.67 0.52 0.79 0.63 0.40 0.98
ρχ Beta 0.50 0.15 0.93 0.91 0.96 0.90 0.87 0.93
ρz Beta 0.50 0.15 0.94 0.91 0.98 0.92 0.87 0.96
σp Inv Gamma 0.15 0.15 1.19 0.87 1.64 0.98 0.75 1.33
σw Inv Gamma 0.15 0.15 1.11 0.89 1.32 1.27 0.98 1.58
σr Inv Gamma 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.17
σz Inv Gamma 0.15 0.15 1.01 0.83 1.18 0.75 0.69 0.83
σχ Inv Gamma 0.15 0.15 2.98 2.26 3.85 2.95 2.55 3.42
pre-Volcker period than during the Great Moderation. In addition, there are important
differences in the Calvo parameter estimates. A comparison of the estimation results
from the two samples shows that the difference between wage and price stickiness
parameters in the two models becomes significant when the pre-Volcker period is
considered, as wage stickiness was higher and price stickiness was lower compared
to the more recent period of the Great Moderation.
The third set of parameter estimates consists of the policy rule parameters (μr , μπ
and μy). The estimates from the pre-Volcker period are similar to those found for the
Great Moderation period, except for the inflation coefficient, which is significantly
lower for the two models in the pre-Volcker period. This result is in line with previ-
ous evidence reported in the literature (Lubik and Schorfheide 2004; Canova 2009).
Moreover, the estimated inflation coefficient, lower than one, associatedwith theCMV
model implies that the Taylor principle did not hold during this period. The fourth set
comprises the autoregressive and standard deviation of shocks. On the one hand, the
autoregressive parameters (ρχ and ρz) show a great deal of persistence across samples.
On the other hand, the standard deviation of price, productivity and, to a lesser extent,
IS shocks are much larger in the pre-Volcker than in the Great Moderation period. By
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contrast, the standard deviations of wage setting shocks and interest rate shocks are
similar across samples.
6 Welfare cost of business cycle fluctuations
Let us start with a quick survey of recent results. Otrok (2001) and Lucas (2003) argue
that the welfare cost of US business cycles is small. They calculate a welfare loss
around 0.05% of consumption. Such low welfare cost is obtained in a model with per-
fect competition and flexible prices. Costain and Reiter (2005) calculate the welfare
cost of business cycles in a model with search frictions and flexible prices, finding
numbers significantly larger than Otrok and Lucas, in the range between 0.25 and
0.33% of consumption. Levin et al. (2005) estimate the welfare cost of US post-war
business cycles using a model that incorporates two sources of nominal rigidities:
sticky prices and sticky wages. They find a welfare cost of 2.6% of steady-state con-
sumption, which is much higher than numbers from previous studies. As pointed out
in their paper, nominal rigidities can bring cross-sectional dispersion in relative prices
and wages that produce large disparities in labor assignments and, therefore, welfare
losses. For example, the highwage dispersion observedwith persistent wage stickiness
would result in a vast differentiation of hours that would damage total utility.
As our particular contribution to the literature, we have calculated the welfare cost
of US business cycles in the estimated models. The welfare cost would correspond
to cyclical fluctuations during the Great Moderation, using the Bayesian estimation
results reported in Table 1. Given the small macroeconomic volatility observed in that
period, this exercise may bring a floor value for the socioeconomic cost of cyclical
fluctuations. The welfare cost is obtained by quantifying the utility loss caused by
short-run fluctuations. A three-step procedure is implemented. First, we take a sec-
ond-order approximation to the instantaneous utility function (1) in order to find the
influence of business cycle variabilities and price/wage dispersions. The second step
consists of computing the unconditional expectation of the second-order approxima-
tion. It renders in the CMV model19:
E
[
U C MV
]
= U ss − 1
2
σvar(c) − 1
2
1
σ − 1var(χ) + cov(c, χ) −
1
2
γvar(n)
−1
2
γ
[
θ2ηp
(1 − α)2(1 − ηp)2 var(
δπ p)
+ θ
2η2wτ
2
1
(1 − α)2(1 − ηw)2
(1 − ηp)
(1 − ηwηp)var(
δπw)
]
,
where var(a) refers to the unconditional variance of variable a, cov(a, b) denotes the
unconditional covariance between variables a and b, and both δπ p = π p − δpπ p−1
and δπw = πw − δwπw−1 are changes in price inflation and wage inflation adjusted
19 The proof is written in a technical appendix available from the authors upon request. Steady-state
employment has been normalized to one, which implies unit steady-state consumption.
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using the indexation weights.20 The last line of E
[
U C MV
]
collects the welfare cuts
caused by nominal rigidities because it would be cancelled out with both flexible prices
and flexible wages, i.e. by setting ηp = ηw = 0. Finally, the third step measures the
welfare cost of cyclical fluctuations as the percentage increase in consumption required
to compensate for the utility loss caused by short-run variability.
For a comparison, the unconditional expectation of the utility function in the EHL
model is given by the following expression
E
[
U E H L
]
= U ss − 1
2
σvar(c) − 1
2
1
σ−1var(χ) + cov(c, χ) −
1
2
γvar(n)
−1
2
γ
[
θ2ηp
(1 − α)2(1 − ηp)2 var(
δπ p) + θ
2
f ηw
(1 − ηw)2 var(
δπw)
]
.
The difference between E
[
U C MV
]
and E
[
U E H L
]
is21
E
[
U C MV
]
− E
[
U E H L
]
= −1
2
γ
(
θ2η2wτ
2
1
(1 − α)2(1 − ηw)2
(1 − ηp)
(1 − ηwηp) −
θ2f ηw
(1−ηw)2
)
var(δπw),
whichmaybe either positive or negative. This difference captures the distinct treatment
of the labor market and wage setting between the two models.
Table 9 reports the results of the welfare cost of cyclical fluctuations measured by
the consumption equivalent. The baseline CMV model estimates a welfare loss of
0.60% of steady-state consumption. The version of the sticky-wage model of EHL
(2000) delivers a lower welfare loss estimate equal to 0.31% of steady-state consump-
tion. These numbers are clearly larger than Lucas and Otrok’s estimates, probably
because they did not allow labor dispersion in their perfect competition setup without
wage rigidity. In addition, the welfare loss of business cycles in the CMVmodel is also
larger than the number found by Costain and Reiter (2005), which suggests that search
frictions are not as influential as sticky wages for employment dispersion. However,
the numbers obtained here are approximately one third of the values provided by Levin
et al. (2005) in a model also featuring sticky prices and sticky wages. Such difference
can be due to two reasons: (i) Levin et al. (2005)’s number is obtained with post-war
data that shows higher cyclical variability, and (ii) Levin et al. (2005)’s model includes
real money balances in the utility function which adds welfare losses coming from
monetary fluctuations.
Also shown in Table 9, the CMV model gives a higher welfare cost than the EHL
model (0.60 vs 0.31%). The higher cost of short-run fluctuations in the CMV model
20 It should be noticed that the adjusted change of price inflation gives a measure of “price dispersion”
since it is proportional to the log deviation between optimal prices and the aggregate price level, δπ p =
1−ηp
ηp
log
(
P∗
P
)
. The same kind of relationship applies to nominal wages, δπw = 1−ηwηw log
(
W∗
W
)
.
21 Obviously, this difference holds only in case the models were empirically equivalent with the same
estimates for the structural parameters and identical variance–covariance statistics.
123
SERIEs (2012) 3:395–422 419
Table 9 Welfare cost of business cycle fluctuations (% of steady-state consumption)
CMV model EHL model
Baseline estimation 0.60 0.31
Imposing flexible wages (ηw = 0) 0.31 0.16
Imposing flexible prices (ηp = 0) 0.28 0.20
Imposing flexible wages and prices (ηw = ηp = 0) 0.23 0.08
Shutting down demand shocks (χ = εR = 0) 0.15 0.18
Shutting down cost-push shocks (υ p = υw = 0) 0.48 0.15
Shutting down demand and cost-push shocks (χ = εR = υ p = υw = 0) 0.04 0.02
can be explained by the greater impact of sticky wages on labor fluctuations. As indi-
cated in the expression of E
[
U C MV
] − E [U E H L] , wage dispersion has a stronger
(negative) impact in the CMVmodel. Intuitively, wage rigidity generates employment
dispersion that is amplified by the interaction between wage setting and price setting.
For example, one firm that was not able to reset the wage in the midst of a demand
contraction has higher-than-averagewages,marginal costs, priceswhichwould reduce
significantly the labor demand and effective employment. In the EHL model, wage
setting behavior is driven by the household-specific mrs gap, which has no direct con-
nection on price setting and effective labor demand. A higher wage rigidity results in
a deep reallocation of specific labor services supplied by different households.
The last term on the expressions for E
[
U C MV
]
and E
[
U E H L
]
shown above brings
the contribution of nominal rigidities to the welfare cost of business cycles. Actually,
Table 9 reports that nominal rigidities cause most welfare cost of business cycle.
If either flexible prices or wages are imposed in the model the welfare loss due to
cyclical fluctuations falls significantly. Thus, having flexible prices in the estimated
CMV model cuts welfare cost in approximately half (from 0.6 to 0.28%). A similar
reduction is observed when having flexible wages (from 0.60 to 0.31%).22 Therefore,
price stickiness and wage stickiness have similar responsibility on the welfare loss
due to cyclical fluctuations. In the EHL model, the results obtained when eliminating
either price or wage stickiness are of similar relevance.
If both flexible prices and wages are assumed, the cost of business cycles is approx-
imately 1/3 of the total cost obtained with nominal rigidities. This result is found in
both models. Subsequently, we can say that 2/3 of the welfare cost of business cycles
can be attributed to nominal frictions on price/wage settings and only 1/3 is due to
shocks variability. The numbers found under flexible prices/wages are much closer to
Lucas’ estimate than the ones obtained in the baseline version of the models. More-
over, these numbers are slightly smaller than Lucas’ estimates when shutting down
demand shocks and cost-push shocks, and only technology shocks would shape the
business cycle. In relative terms, Table 9 shows that shutting down demand shocks
reduces the cost of business cycle more than shutting down cost-push shocks (espe-
cially in the CMV model where eliminating demand shocks cut 3/4 of total welfare
22 Jung andKuester (2009) find awelfare cost of business cycles close to 0.20%of steady-state consumption
in a model that combine sticky prices, search frictions and flexible wages.
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cost). Therefore, demand shocks are the exogenous source of variability behind the
largest portion of the welfare cost of cyclical fluctuations.
7 Conclusions
The New-Keynesian model has been recently extended to incorporate endogenous
fluctuations of unemployment due to search frictions (Trigari 2009; Walsh 2005) or,
alternatively, to sticky wages (Casares 2007, 2010; Galí 2011). We borrow the labor
market structure of Casares (2010) and add inertial behavior of price and wage dynam-
ics to describe a medium-scale New-Keynesian model with unemployment explained
by wage rigidity (CMV model). The CMV model is estimated with Bayesian econo-
metric techniques and compared to an estimated version of the sticky-wage model
of Erceg et al. (2000), referred here as the EHL model, to examine the empirical
implications of introducing unemployment. We use quarterly US data from the “Great
Moderation” period (1984–2008) and also from the pre-Volcker period (1957–1979).
Results of the estimates of structural parameters are similar across models, although
price stickiness is marginally lower and wage stickiness slightly higher in the CMV
model compared with the EHL model. In the comparison across sample periods, we
find that during the Great Moderation price rigidities have risen, while wage stickiness
has fallen. In addition, we have found that the inertial component of price inflation is
not statistically high in any sample period, which implies that US inflation dynamics
have been more forward-looking than backward-looking. As for the sources of vari-
ability, demand-side shocks have been the main driving forces in recent US business
cycles, as they explain most of the observed variability in output, employment, and
the nominal interest rate.
The estimated CMVmodel provides a good matching of the second-moment statis-
tics of unemployment obtained in the data (standard deviation, correlation with output
and autocorrelation). Impulse-response functions show that unemployment is procyc-
lical with demand shocks and countercyclical with supply shocks. In the variance
decomposition of the unemployment rate, demand-side shocks, such as consump-
tion preference innovations on the IS curve and monetary policy shocks, explain most
unemployment variability. A comparablemeasure of unemployment in the EHLmodel
is the log difference between labor under flexible prices/wages and effective labor;
our results show business cycle patterns of this labor gap series rather close to those
observed in unemployment from the CMV model.
We also estimated the CMV model under alternative detrending techniques, both
with and without employment as an observable variable. In all cases, the estimation
results are robust. For the pre-Volcker period, wage stickiness was higher and the
Taylor-rule coefficient of the reaction of the nominal interest rate to inflation devia-
tions was significantly lower than after 1984.
Finally, the welfare cost of short-run fluctuations during the Great Moderation has
been estimated at 0.60% of steady-state consumption in the CMV model and 0.31%
in the EHL model. These numbers are clearly higher than the estimate obtained by
Lucas (2003) in a flexible-pricemodel, but lower than the value reported by Levin et al.
(2005) using a sticky-price, sticky-wage estimated model with post-war US data. Both
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nominal rigidities and demand shocks appear as the main factors behind the welfare
cost of business cycles.
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